Dc 10 and md 11 differences in dating

McDonnell Douglas DC - Wikipedia

dc 10 and md 11 differences in dating

SECTION PAGE #s DATE ORIGINAL ALL REVISION #1 10/18/96 - Previous differences qualification for mixed- fleet flying or transition of DC variants, MD Providing information to FAA Field Offices about DC and MD- The McDonnell Douglas DC is an American three-engine wide-body jet airliner The DC was succeeded by the related McDonnell Douglas MD, essentially date resulted in a sales competition that affected profitability of the aircraft. The main visible difference between the models is that the series 10 has three. The ultimate guide to the many DC and MD variations. Author: David Hingtgen Submitted by: David Hingtgen Date: Comments: (13).

This AD also requires a revision to the FAA- approved airplane flight manual AFM to advise the flightcrew of the appropriate procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump housing electrical connector if applicable. This AD also requires the deactivation of certain fuel tanks or fuel pumps and the installation of placards if applicable.

This AD allows the optional replacement of the fuel pump housing electrical connectors with new, improved parts, which would terminate the AFM revisions, deactivation of certain fuel tanks and fuel pumps, and placard installation. This AD results from a report of two failures of the fuel pump housing electrical connector.

dc 10 and md 11 differences in dating

We are issuing this AD to prevent continued arcing following a short circuit of the fuel pump housing electrical connector, which could damage the conduit that protects the power lead inside the fuel tank; this condition could create an ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

This AD becomes effective August 8, The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of August 8, On December 5, 65 FRNovember 20,the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain other publication listed in the AD.

dc 10 and md 11 differences in dating

We must receive comments on this AD by September 24, Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD. DOT Docket Web site: Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Data and Service Management, Dept. The airplanes had accumulated 3, and 3, flight hours since installation of the electrical connector in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MDA The failures were attributed to arcing between the contacts in the potted backside of the electrical connector.

Subsequent x-ray inspections of the electrical connectors revealed soldering problems with the connector contacts. Continued arcing following a short circuit of the fuel pump housing electrical connector could damage the conduit that protects the power lead inside the fuel tank. This condition, if not corrected, could create an ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

dc 10 and md 11 differences in dating

Therefore, all of these models may be subject to the same unsafe condition. That AD requires revising the airplane flight manual AFM to ensure that the flightcrew is advised of appropriate procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump electrical connector.

For certain airplanes, that AD also requires revising the AFM to prohibit resetting of tripped fuel pump circuit breakers. Accomplishing the optional replacement of all electrical connectors in accordance with paragraph k or l of this AD, as applicable, terminates the requirements of AD Accomplishing the optional replacement of all electrical connectors in accordance with paragraph k of this AD terminates the requirements of AD Relevant Service Information We have reviewed the following service bulletins: The service bulletins also describe procedures for installing a placard on or adjacent to the flight engineer's fuel control panel or adjacent to display units 1 and 6, as applicable.

The IOPs advise the flightcrew of proper procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump housing electrical connector.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD The unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design. For this reason, we are issuing this AD to prevent continued arcing following a short circuit of the fuel pump housing electrical connector, which could damage the conduit that protects the power lead inside the fuel tank; this condition could create an ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

If that electrical connector is installed, this AD requires the following additional actions: Revising the Procedures section of the FAA-approved AFM to advise the flightcrew of the appropriate procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump housing electrical connector. Deactivating certain fuel tanks or fuel pumps, as applicable. Installing placards on or adjacent to the flight engineer's fuel control panel or adjacent to display units 1 and 6, as applicable.

This AD also allows the optional replacement of the fuel pump housing electrical connectors with new, improved parts, which would terminate the AFM revisions, deactivation of certain fuel tanks and fuel pumps, and placard installation. This AD does not require any action for Group 5 airplanes. Also, this AD does not require accomplishing Work Package 2 for Groups 1, 2, and 3 airplanes and does not require accomplishing Work Package 5 for Group 4 airplanes; these work packages describe procedures for replacing the affected electrical connectors on tanks 1, 2, and 3.

This AD does not require accomplishing Work Package 5 for Group 1 airplanes and does not require accomplishing Work Package 6 for Group 2 airplanes; these work packages describe procedures for replacing the affected electrical connectors on main tanks 1 and 3. The compliance tables in paragraph 1.

dc 10 and md 11 differences in dating

This AD, however, would require accomplishing those actions within 14 days after the effective date of this AD. We have coordinated this difference with Boeing.

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Surgery is performed on the ground and the operating room is located between the wings for maximum stability. Using outward-opening doors allowed the DC's cargo area to be completely filled, since the door was not occupying usable interior space when open. To secure the door against the outward force from the pressurization of the fuselage at high altitudes, outward-opening doors must use heavy locking mechanisms. In the event of a door lock malfunction, there is great potential for explosive decompression.

American Airlines Flight 96 A problem with the outward-opening cargo door first became publicly known on June 12,when American Airlines Flight 96 lost its aft cargo door shortly after takeoff from Detroit Metro Airportin flight above Windsor, Ontario. Before Flight 96 took off, an airport employee had forced the door shut. Due to the cargo door's design, the door appeared to be securely locked despite the internal locking mechanism not being fully engaged.

The door relied on a set of heavy steel hooks to secure it against the door frame. When the hooks were fully engaged, an outside lever on the cargo door could be depressed to drive a set of locking pins through the hooks to hold them in place. The NTSB investigation found that it was possible to close the outside lever without the hooks being fully engaged, and there would be no outward signs that the locking mechanism was not engaged; the cargo-door indicator in the cockpit would still register the door as being secured without hooks and locking pins being in the closed position.

This combination of factors caused Flight 96 to take off without its aft cargo door being fully locked. Following the Windsor accident investigation, the NTSB made several recommendations, including repairing the faulty cargo door design to make it impossible for baggage handlers to close the cargo door lever without the locking pins being fully engaged. It was also recommended that vents be installed in the cabin floor, so that in case of an explosive decompression, the pressure difference between the cabin and cargo bay could quickly be equalized without collapsing the cabin floor and damaging critical control systems.

McDonnell Douglas did make modifications to the cargo door, but the basic design remained unchanged and problems persisted.

MD-11 / DC-10 comparison

Turkish Airlines Flight On March 3,an almost identical cargo-door blowout caused Turkish Airlines Flight to crash into a forest near the town of ErmenonvilleFrance, shortly after leaving Paris. The cargo door had not been fully locked, though it appeared so to both cockpit crew and ground personnel.

The Turkish aircraft had a different seating configuration that made the effects of decompression much more severe, which caused the aircraft's floor to collapse into the cargo bay. Control cables running through the floor beams were severed when the floor collapsed and rendered the aircraft uncontrollable.

The loss of hydraulic pressure to the leading edge slat actuators caused the slats to retract due to aerodynamic forcesincreasing the left wing's stall speed above the engine failure climb out speed being used by the pilots. With the left wing stalled and further destabilized by asymmetric thrustthe DC rapidly rolled to the left, sharply descended, and crashed, killing all people on board and two individuals on the ground.

The crash and its aftermath were widely covered by the media and dealt a severe blow to the DC's reputation and sales. It grounded U. Even ferry flying within U. American Airlines mechanics had removed the engine and its pylon as a unit, rather than removing the engine from the pylon, then removing the pylon from the wing, as recommended by McDonnell Douglas.

The faulty procedure was done using a forkliftwhich resulted in inadvertent structural damage. It was subsequently discovered that this short-cut procedure, believed to save many man-hours on maintenance, was being used by three major airlines, although McDonnell Douglas had advised against it.

The number two tail engine suffered an uncontained fan disk failure in flight, which damaged all three hydraulic systems and rendered the hydraulic flight controls inoperable. The crew managed to fly the aircraft onto the runway in a partially controlled manner, and of the people on board survived died despite the destruction of the aircraft during the crash landing.

All three hydraulic systems were in close proximity, directly beneath the tail engine. The 2 engine explosion hurled fragments that ruptured all three lines, resulting in total loss of control to the elevators, ailerons, spoilers, horizontal stabilizer, rudder, flaps and slats.

McDonnell Douglas DC-10

It is still possible to lose all three hydraulic systems elsewhere. This nearly happened to a cargo airliner in during takeoff when a main-gear tire exploded in the wheel well. The damage in the left wing area caused total loss of pressure from the 1 and the 2 hydraulic systems. The 3 system was dented but not penetrated. November 3, — National Airlines Flight 27a DC cruising at 39, feet, experienced an uncontained failure of the right number 3 engine.

One cabin window separated from the fuselage after it was struck by debris flung from the exploding engine. The passenger sitting next to that window was killed and ejected from the aircraft. The crew initiated an emergency descent, and landed the aircraft safely.

All passengers and crew survived. This is the first hull loss of a DC aircraft.